Publications
Business as usual on China will ruin us
Ross Babbage
12:00AM November 23, 2024
Australian business as usual on China will ruin us | The Australian
Deterrence and alliance power: Why the AUKUS submarines matter and how they can be delivered
The report on AUKUS published by the Lowy Institute can be downloaded at:
Australia is confronted by three big changes in our strategic circumstances that are making our steady-as-you-go approaches to security and economic development untenable.
We face a markedly increased risk of war in the Indo-Pacific; the global economy is restructuring rapidly in adverse ways; and the Australian economy has stalled with essentially zero.
Australia’s Job Now: A chapter in: Matt Pottinger (ed) The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 2024.
The Challenge of Maximising Australia’s Deterrence Power
In Australia the goal of deterrence is mostly pursued in an ill-disciplined and incoherent manner. The selection, scaling and operational employment of defense and other strategic systems is usually driven by the need to replace current capabilities, operational habits, a military service’s preference, domestic political imperatives or by budgetary allocations. Almost as an afterthought, selected options are often said to enhance deterrence. This behavior is flawed if one’s primary goal is to deter military action by a major power.
There is a need for greater precision, especially when Australian decision-makers consider how best to deter specific events, such as a Chinese assault on Taiwan. Planning to maximize combat power or achieve other goals may be laudable but they are not the same as preparing to optimize deterrence. Deterrence involves using one’s actions to deliver the strongest possible psychological impact on the opposing decision-making elite so as to persuade them to desist, delay or otherwise alter their operations to one’s advantage. In order to have greatest impact, deterrence operations need to focus on credibly placing at risk things that the opposing leadership values highly or considers especially sensitive. Such threats or pressures do not necessarily need be overt or direct. Nor do threatening capabilities always need to be displayed. In some situations it may be sufficient simply to assert or imply the existence of a capability that can threaten a high value target for an opponent to be deterred.
For a medium power such as Australia, applying strong deterrence power against an opposing decision-making elite is a sophisticated form of signaling. It is the communication of a compelling message often using a combination of military and non-military instruments so that the opposing decision-makers become deeply concerned about the consequences that would flow if they act against the interests of Australia and its allies.
Not all types of deterrence work the same way. There are two main categories. First is offensive deterrence that, in its most basic form, threatens that: “If you hit me, I will hit you back harder and you will regret hitting me in the first place.” This might be called ‘cobra deterrence’. The second main category is defensive deterrence. This involves sending a strong message that: “If you strike me, you will get such a bloody arm that you will regret striking me.” This might be called ‘porcupine deterrence’. Both categories are relevant to Australia’s security challenges but careful planning is needed to get the balance right.
Also relevant is the leverage rating – or power – of a particular instrument or action to force an opponent to change course. How strong a leveraging effect will a particular initiative have on the opposing decision-making elite? When wishing to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan will ‘Option A’ have a stronger psychological impact on Xi Jinping and his colleagues than ‘Option K’? It is important to note here that the views of the Chinese leadership should not be assumed to mirror-image those of allied leaders. The Chinese Communist Party’s key players have markedly different mindsets to those of Australian and other allied security planners and so decision-making in this area needs to be made with great care. Assessments of options for delivering deterrence power should be made using the advice of expert analysts who follow the Chinese leaders’ actions closely, can mimic their values and much of their thinking and accurately predict their next moves.
Then there is the question of the intensity rating of a particular deterrent measure and the manner in which it is expressed. For instance, if an Australian government document mentions that in the event of a military attack on Taiwan practical support would be delivered to the Taiwanese armed forces, the deterrence intensity rating might score 1 out of 10. However, if such a commitment to defend democratic Taiwan were publicly stated with strong emotion several times by the Australian prime minister, the intensity rating might rise to 3. Then, if such a commitment were delivered simultaneously with strong coordinated statements from the U.S. president and the Japanese prime minister, the intensity rating might rise to 7 or 8. So in weighing the deterrence power of various Australian options, it is not only the specific action that is relevant but also the way it is expressed or delivered and by whom.
Other important factors in weighing deterrence options are cost-effectiveness and the ease and speed with which they can be implemented. Some options would clearly be more demanding of human and financial resources than others. Preferred options may draw on extant skills and other resources and offer strong deterrence power quickly at modest cost.
A final and critical consideration when rating deterrence options is the level of shock that an action can deliver to authoritarian state decision-makers by suddenly short-circuiting their offensive plans. Is there an option that could take the opponent by surprise by rendering a key pillar of their strategic stance crippled or useless? Do Australia and its allies have an option that unexpectedly changes ‘the rules’, negating a key part of the opponent’s defense in a way that cannot be effectively countered? In other words, does Australia, in partnership with its allies, have a ‘third offset’ option – analogous to the American-led ‘first offset’ in the 1950s and the ‘second offset’ strategy in the 1980s? If the answer is ‘probably yes’, then this should be a core goal of Australian deterrence-led strategy.
What this discussion makes clear is that maximizing Australia’s deterrence of a war over Taiwan would not be simple. It is unlikely to be achieved by accident. It requires a careful weighing of the type of deterrence, the leverage power and the intensity of a wide range of options, their cost-effectiveness, the speed with which they can be delivered and their potential to psychologically disarm the opponent’s key decision-makers.
Many deterrence options would require the involvement not only of Australia’s defense organization and the country’s national security agencies but other government departments, business leaders, elements of broader Australian society and, in most cases, coordination with allies and security partners. In contrast to Australia’s military commitments during the last half century, maximizing deterrence of an expansionist China will require much more than contracting the task out to the Australian Defence Force to manage. It will need careful analysis of new multi-domain options, the fostering of a more innovative and fast-moving culture, a re-shaping of some organizations and operating within a society that is well informed, very supportive and actively involved.
All of this is possible, but it is far removed from current practice. This chapter considers briefly a menu of ten investment options that if delivered well could contribute significantly to Australia’s deterrence of a Chinese assault on Taiwan and its potential escalation to a major Indo-Pacific war. A key question is which of the options promises the strongest deterrence power in a cost-effective and timely way.
For more details about this book and purchase options, please visit:
The Next Major War: Can the US and Its Allies Win Against China?
This book is the product of two and a half years of intensive research and extensive consultation with leading experts in the United States, Australia and the broader allied community.
What is the Book About?
Key questions the book addresses include:
- How likely is a major war in the Indo Pacific?
- How would such a war begin?
- How are China and the United States preparing to fight such a war? (Actually, very differently.)
- What would be the driving goals and game plans of each side?
- What are each side’s strengths and weaknesses?
- How would such a war progress? What would be the primary phases?
- How long would such a war last?
- What would be the supply chain, business and broader economic dynamics of such a war?
- How ready are the two sides to fight and win such a war in this decade?
- And how could America and its allies prevail in such a calamitous contingency?
What Do Independent Experts Say?
“A timely, sobering, and essential read for anyone who wants to understand in detail how a major war in the Indo-Pacific would unfold, the strengths and weaknesses of the United States and China along with their partners, the likely economic and business impacts, and the measures that need to be taken now for the United States and its allies to deter China—and if necessary, to prevail. As concern grows that China will invade Taiwan before mid-century, the issues examined in this book are crucial for policymakers, militaries, academics, and business leaders to consider.”
Bonnie Glaser, Director, Asia Program, German Marshall Fund of the US
“In this prize jewel of a book, Babbage provides an eagle-eyed look ahead at the worst political, economic, and military crises in the near future—and, very importantly, a critical blueprint for averting these. Politicians, business leaders, journalists, and everyday citizens should read Babbage’s urgent roadmap for deterring—or, as may be necessary, winning—the war Beijing is cooking up.”
Matt Pottinger, former US Deputy National Security Adviser
“U.S. officials now warn of a growing risk of war with China. But how might such a conflict begin? How long would it last? And what factors would be most important in determining its outcome? The Next Major War is an outstanding book that offers the deepest and most wide-ranging analysis to date of these questions, going far beyond the usual comparisons of weapons systems and operational concepts to explore the economic, political, and societal dimensions of a possible future clash between the Pacific superpowers.” Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University
“In The Next Major War, Ross Babbage, one of Australia’s foremost strategic thinkers, provides a timely, insightful, and much-needed net assessment of the threat posed by China to the Indo-Pacific liberal international order—and how to meet it. The insights derived from Babbage’s study of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical chessboard and military balance exemplifies Clausewitz’s coup d’oeil—the ability to see the interrelationships among all the major factors shaping the intensifying rivalry between China, and the United States and its allies. The Next Major War is a serious, important, and timely gem that is mandatory reading for all senior officials charged with deterring Chinese aggression and, should deterrence fail, defeating it.”
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., President and CEO, Solarium LLC; and Founder, former President, and CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
“Ross Babbage has produced a timely and clear-eyed study of the multitude of challenges posed by a resurgent China across the Indo-Pacific. His examination of alliance weaknesses—and the opportunities available to the US, Japan, Australia, and others in this dynamic environment—is highly relevant to government, military, national security, and scholarly communities across the globe.”
Mick Ryan, Major General, Australian Army (ret.)
“The Next Major War represents an appropriately sober appeal and is a sobering forewarning to the United States and its allies to take seriously the prospect of a major war with China. More than that, it is an urgent call to action to prepare for such an increasingly likely contingency. Babbage’s book will be of intense interest to soldiers and statesmen alike.”
Thomas G. Mahnken, President and CEO, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; and Senior Research Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS
“The Next Major War is an absolute wake-up call for the national security / foreign policy / political ‘ruling classes.’ There’s a lot more to taking on China than building a 500-ship US Navy and getting the military part right. Changed mindsets in all parts of society are required—this includes leadership in the business world. This book lays out the dangers and what’s required to counter them. It offers perspectives that aren’t readily found in existing literature on the China threat issue. The book synthesizes a wide range of existing information on the topic in a way not done before, including the author’s original earlier research on Chinese and Russian political warfare, which is impressive on its own. This presents a new approach to analyzing and understanding the China threat, which is heavily covered by analysts and pundits, so producing a new or novel approach that stands out is no small feat. A strength of the book is its clarity; some of the topics—financial and economic, for example—can be hard to understand, yet these parts are clearly presented, which is also not easy to accomplish. The various conflict scenarios are easily laid out and flow well—another task that is not easy. As such, this book is a helpful tool for recognizing and understanding the range of issues and influences involved in national security matters—as well as the need for a broad perspective when assessing such topics.”
Grant Newsham, Colonel, US Marines (ret.) and former executive director, Morgan Stanley Japan
More Details and Options for Purchase
Purchase options and other information can be found at:
The Next Major War: Can the US and its Allies Win Against China?
Are the Indo-Pacific allies certain that their defence planning for the coming two decades is built on sound foundations? Many Western security analysts assume that a modernised version of their highly networked, combined arms operations will be able to prevail in any major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. 1 But is this right?
If there is to be a major war in the Indo-Pacific, it is likely to involve a struggle between China and a small number of supporters on the one hand and the United States and its allies and partners on the other. The precise sequence of events in such a catastrophe is difficult to predict but it is certain that Beijing will have as much, or even more, say over the shape of the conflict as Washington. This is a serious problem for the West because the core agencies of the Chinese government bring strategic cultures, strategies, operational concepts and priorities to the Indo-Pacific that are markedly different from our own. When viewed in this context, even an advanced version of conventional Western strategies and operations could prove seriously inadequate.
The Western allies need to ensure they plan to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win a future war, not just a part of a war, or even the wrong war.
There are at least ten reasons for doubting that the West’s perception of future war in the Indo-Pacific is sound.
In Which Way the Dragon?, CSBA Nonresident Fellow Ross Babbage and colleagues argue for a new, scenario-based approach to defense and security planning in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing upon expert analysis of current conditions, three to four overarching scenarios for China should be considered as potential guideposts over the next 15 years. Each outcome would include a series of lead indicators, allowing analysts to determine which future scenario China is headed towards, prepare for potential alternatives in advance, and make adjustments to strategies, operational concepts, and military and security systems when necessary. The end result should markedly reduce the uncertainties about the strategic environment in the 2035 timeframe and provide greatly improved foundations for confident decisions on security policy and capability development. In short, this approach offers a superior way of addressing the security challenges faced by the Western allies and their security partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Stealing a March: Chinese Hybrid Warfare in the Indo-Pacific: Issues and Options for Allied Defense Planners
Stealing a March: Chinese Hybrid Warfare in the Indo-Pacific: Issues and Options for Allied Defense Planners: Volumes 1 & 2 examines Beijing’s hybrid warfare campaigns, their origins, means and modes, level of success and possible future shape. It also assesses the primary options for U.S. and allied counter-strategy.
Winning Without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail: Volumes 1 & 2 assesses the role of political warfare in Chinese and Russian strategy. The report goes beyond diagnosing the challenge to offer a range of potential allied counter-strategies and proposes a new conceptual approach to such thinking.
Countering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies Against Authoritarian Political Warfare
Countering Comprehensive Coercion offers policymakers a better understanding of the threat they face. It argues that Russian and Chinese malign activities should be viewed part of a unique form of authoritarian political warfare: comprehensive coercion. Unlike most Western nations, Russia and China have long histories of engaging in political warfare, deep insecurities that have driven them to embrace a particularly aggressive brand of political warfare, and highly centralized governments that enable them to integrate and coordinate the diverse elements of political warfare campaigns.
Meanwhile, democratic nations are particularly vulnerable to comprehensive coercion because the open nature of their societies provides many pathways for rivals to shape and influence, while gaps and seams across government agencies can make an effective response difficult to mount. Nevertheless, Countering Comprehensive Coercion also highlights how the targets of authoritarian political warfare campaigns can better position themselves to compete, not only by reducing their vulnerability but also by adopting more forward-leaning measures of their own.
What should the U.S. and its close allies do about China’s strategic expansion into the South China Sea?
Beijing now has overwhelming military, coastguard and maritime militia forces in this theatre and it has seized numerous reefs and dredged up new islands in operations that that the U.N’s Permanent Court of Arbitration has determined are illegal. Major military installations are being built in several locations. Three of these new islands, towards the middle of the South China Sea, will soon be capable of housing regiments of fighter-bomber aircraft and also of supporting sustained operations of significant numbers of ships. The rapidly changing strategic balance in Southeast Asia and the Western allies’ flat-footed response is encouraging several regional states to re-evaluate their long-standing security relationships.
This report argues that it is time for the U.S. and its close allies to clarify their goals in this theatre and develop a coherent strategy to counter China’s expansionist operations. It describes a surprisingly broad range of strategy and operational options that are potentially available for the Trump administration to pressure Beijing to moderate its behaviour, retrace some of its steps and deter the Chinese leadership from embarking on new, potentially more dangerous adventures.
Strategic Forum Notes
These are thought-pieces on key strategic issues that are relatively short; normally 2-5 pages in length. Priority is given to items that address a critical future issue that has relevance for multiple departments and agencies. Emphasis is also generally given to the discussion of practical options.
There are no Strategic Forum Notes available at this time.
Strategic Forum Papers
These are longer papers or research reports, many of which have been prepared following extensive discussions with relevant officials and other experts. Priority is generally given to topics that address a critical future issue that has relevance for multiple departments and agencies. These papers also contain discussion of practical options and frequently include policy-relevant recommendations.
Strategic Forum Papers are often the product of detailed discussions with relevant experts at one or more closed workshops.
Strategic Forum Papers can be of any length but, in general, preference is given to shorter, highly readable thought-pieces.
There are no Strategic Forum Papers available at this time.
Guidance for Authors
Intending authors of Strategic Forum Notes and Papers are encouraged to contact the Editor of these publications at an early stage in order to discuss the general nature of their proposal and in order to access the Strategic Forum Writing Style Guide.
The Editor of all Strategic Forum publications can be reached at:
Please note that Strategic Forum Notes and Strategic Forum Papers represent the views of the authors alone. They are published in the interests of advancing strategic thought on Australia’s future security challenges. These publications do not necessarily represent the views of Strategic Forum, nor of its directors.